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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD 'YARREN, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DIXON RANCH COMPANY,:>~ 
Appellant. 
Respondent's Brief 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7848 
Respondent desires, for purposes of clarity and 
convenience, to restate the facts upon which this case 
arises and to expand them somewhat to give a clearer 
picture of the problems involved. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property in question was sold to Duchesne 
County for taxes assessed against the Dixon Ranch 
Company (Abstract, Ex. A), and the respondent, 
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plaintiff below, and his predecessors purchased the 
same from Duchesne County, and have paid the taxes 
thereon for the past 15 years ( R. 50, Ex. A) . 
This action by the respondent to quiet title was 
commenced in April of 1951, by the filing of a com-
plaint (R. 2, 3). Summons was served upon the Val-
ley Investment Company and an answer filed by that 
company on June 19, 1951. Thereafter, on July 11, 
1951, the Valley Investment Company filed a dis-
claimer (R. 9). l 
A summons and complaint were served upon 
Dixon Ranch Company and upon Arnold Dixon 
( R. 7) . Arnold Dixon was the sole surviving director 
of the Pixon Ranch Company, which vvas a defunct 
corporation (R. 7, 59). Service upon the Dixon Ranch 
Company and upon Arnold Dixon was complete on 
May 26, 1951 ( R. 7), and the default of these parties 
was entered July 11, 1951. 
Service by publication was had as to J. G. Brown 
who was not a resident of Utah and whose where-
abouts was unknown (R. 12, 16, 24). Publication of 
Summons was complete August 23, 1951. Time for 
answer by Brown under the published Summons ex-
pired September 12, 1951, and default of J. G. Brown 
was entered September 13, 1951. 
An answer, purporting to be that of the Dixon 
Ranch Company, was filed September 13,, 1951, 90 
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days after ans,ver \Vas due, and 64 days after the 
default of that Con1pany had been entered. Upon 
motion of respondent this purported answer and 
counterclaim \Yere stricken as having been untimely 
filed and having not been properly served upon 
plaintiff or his counsel CR. 29,32). Thereupon the 
court entered judgment for the respondent on Octo-
ber 16th, 1951. 
Thereafter, on November 13, 1951 there was 
filed by counsel for Dixon Ranch Company and 
Arnold Dixon, a motion to Vacate Judgment CR. 39). 
An affida"\'it accompanying said motion recites that 
Arnold Dixon, upon v1hom service was made, was 
and had for a long time been seriously ill and did 
not notify interested parties (R. 40). A counter-affi-
davit was filed by the plantiff reciting among other 
things that the default of the Dixon Ranch Company 
was entered July 11, 1951 and that Dixon Ranch 
Company had no answer properly filed in the case 
CR. 50). 
On January 7, 1952, the Motion of Dixon Ranch 
Company and Arnold Dixon to Vacate Judgment, 
was heard and counsel for defendants failed to ap-
pear. The court after consideration of the evidence 
denied the motion, (R. 53) and entered an order to 
that effect (R. 54). 
Counsel for Dixon Ranch Company then filed 
a motion for Reconsideration, reciting that the de-
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fendant Dixon Ranch Company had not received 
notice of the hearing (R. 56). Upon a hearing on 
February 18, 1952, the court granted the motion for 
reconsideration and heard counsel on the motion to 
Vacate. After arguments the court took the matter 
under advisement and gave counsel an opportunity 
to file a brief in support of the motion and give plain-
tiff an opportunity to file a brief in opposition (R. 62). 
On March 20, 1952, the court filed a Memoran-
dum Decision denying defendants' motion (R. 63, 
64), and expanding at some length his his reasons 
for denying the motion. 
* * 
The Notice of Appeal filed herein recites that 
the appellants are Dixon Ranch Company, a corpo-
ration, Arnold Dixon and Paul Dixon, on behalf of 
the stockholders of the Dixon Ranch Company 
(R. 70). The undertaking on appeal recites the de-
fendants Arnold Dixon and Dixon Ranch Company 
have appealed (R. 73). The statement of Points on 
Appeal recites that the defendants "Arnold Dixon, 
Dixon Ranch Company and Paul, Dixon, stockholder 
of the Dixon Ranch Company', set out their state-
ment of points on appeal (R. 79). All of which leaves 
some doubt as to exactly who is pursuing the appeal. 
In their Statement of Points Relied Upon, the 
appellants, whoever they may be, recite the follow-
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ing as points relied upon ( R. 79) : 
* * * 
2. That the record shows pursuasive evi-
dence of due diligence on the part of the de-
fendants so as to bring them within the mean-
ing of 60 (b) U.R.C.P. 
* * * 
+. That the court has no discretion in 
deciding the questionr of whether the stock-
holders should be allowed to defend the action 
but is compelled to allow them to defend. 
5. That title to the assets of a dissolved 
corporation is vested in the stockholders. 
6. That service of process upon Arnold 
Dixon, sole surviving director of the Dixon 
Ranch Company, was not due process so as to 
preclude the stockholders from defending the 
action. 
7. Since title to property of a corporation 
is vested in the stockholders, they are entitled 
to personal service of process before they can 
be deprived of their property. 
However, in their brief the appellants indicate 
that they vvaive all of the points set out above. (Ap-
pellants Brief page 2.) 
It appears, therefore, that this appeal must nec-
essarily be treated as an appeal by the Dixon Ranch 
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Company, rather than as stated by Appellants Brief, 
to include stockholde~s appealing on behalf of them-
selves and the rest of the stockholders (Appellants 
Brief p. 1), and the appellant may not merely "con-
cede" that there was service upon Arnold Dixon indi-
vidually and as the sole surviving director of the 
Dixon Ranch Company (Appellants Brief p. 7), but 
rather, has admitted this to be proper service upon 
the corporation. 
.b 
STATEMENT Of POINTS 
1. The Court in the exercise of sound 
discretion properly denied defendants motion 
to Vacate the default entered. 
A. The defendants failed to establish 
excusable neglect to require set-
ting aside the default. 
B. The defendants failed to establish 
a meritorious defense which would 
require the Court to vacate the de· 
fault. 
2. The Court correctly ruled that it 
would not be proper to grant the motion to va-
cate merely for the purpose of permitting a 
cross action between certain of the defendants. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court in the exercise of sound discretion properly 
denied defendants motion to Vacate the defau,t. 
In order for the Appellant to prevail, it is neces-
sary that it establish first that there was excusable 
neglect on its part which would be sufficient to justify 
the court in setting aside its default, and second it 
must establish that it had a meritorous defense to 
the suit itself. Failing in either of these matters con-
stitutes a failure to establish error on the part of the 
trial court in its ruling. Since the matter admittedly 
is one of discretion with the trial court, the appellant 
has the laboring oar to establish that the trial court 
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
The respondent does not disagree with the prin-
ciple espoused in Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 254, 90 
P. 897, that the decision as to whether or not the judg-
ment should be vacated is one to be passed upon by 
the court in its sound discretion, nor the rule an-
nounced in Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908, 
that "the discretion lodged in the court by this statute 
to set aside a default is to be exercised in the further-
ance of justice. In doubtful cases the courts vvill in-
cline toward granting relief from defaults to the end 
that a party may have a hearing." 
However, it is equally true that in a case \vhere 
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the court has carefully considered the evidence and 
has given due weight to all the factors involved, and 
in the exercise of sound judicial discretion has denied 
a motion to set aside the default, his ruling should 
be upheld. As stated in 3 Bancroft, Code Practice, 
2479, Sec. 1876: 
"Nevertheless, notwithstanding the re-
medial character of the statutes and their pur-
pose to afford a speedy and efficient means of 
relief, they are not to be invoked so as to im-
pair the attribute of certainty and finality 
which should attend all judgments, and a 
judgment should never be annulled except 
upon due consideration based upon a clear 
showing." 
This principle is clearly announced in the case 
of Carmichael v. Carmichael, 101 Or. 172, 199 P. 385, 
wherein the court said: 
"vVhile section 1 03, Or. L., is remedial in 
its character, and is intended to furnish a sim-
ple, speedy, and efficient means of relief in 
cases where persons are, in the true sense of 
the statute, victims of mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect, yet its whole-
some provisions are not to be invoked, so as to 
render judgments but temporary structures, 
'to be torn down, remodeled, or rebuilt when-
ever the builders feel competent to improve 
the original workmanship or design.' A judg-
ment is sometimes termed a 'finality' because 
it finally terminate the disputes and adjusts 
the adverse interests of litigants, and it should 
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never be annulled, except upon due consider-
ation, based upon a clear showing." 
That the trial court carefully considered and 
weighed the merits of defendants motion to Vacate 
is revealed throughout his lVIemorandum Decis~on 
CR. 64). As the court puts it: 
"The la'v is clear to the effect that the 
trial court has a vvide discretion in an appli-
cation to set aside defaults. However, it is not 
permitted to rule arbitrarily or captiously. 
There must be a legal foundation for its action 
'Whichever way its decision may lie .... " 
A. The defendants failed tot~ establish excusable 
neglect to require setting aside the default. 
The trial court in his Memorandum Decision 
examines the evidence before him upon which de-
fendants predicated their claim of excusable neglect, 
and sets it forth therein. An examination of that evi-
dence will at once reveal its insubstantial character. 
The primary thing upon which defendants had 
to rely, and upon which appellant now has to rely, 
is the statement in the affidavit of Paul Dixon to the 
effect that "Arnold Dixon is and for a long time has 
been ill." As the court so aptly points out, there is no 
indication whatsoever, of the nature of that illness, 
and that no inference can be made that he was, or is, 
mentally afflicted; and that a telephone call or a 
letter would have brought counsel to his side. 
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A similar affidavit was made in the case of Scott 
v. Wright, 50 Neb. 84·0, 70 N.W. 396, which did not 
allege the nature of the defendant's sickness-
whether it was of such a character as to affect his 
mind and deprive him of power to give directions 
concerning a pending lawsuit. On appeal, an order 
vacating the defaut, was reversed. In Reither v. 
Webb, 73 Iowa 559, 35 N.W. 631 it was held that a 
lame back was not sufficient to constitute excusable 
negligence. 
In Quist v. Gwinup, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 105, the plain-
tiff purchased property at tax sale and began pro-
ceedings thereafter based thereon and recovered a 
judgment by default. Thereafter the judgment was 
vacated upon motion of the defendant and the plain-
tiff appealed. 
As a part of the petitioners papers was an affi-
davit by herself stating that she was not in very good 
health and didn't understand the papers served upon 
her. There "vas also an affidavit of a physician to the 
effect that: 
'' ... he had known Eliza Gwinup and that 
she had been suffering from a goiter and had 
been undergoing a change of life for several 
years. She has suffered severe mental shock 
due to tragedies in her life and all these things 
had impaired her physically and had caused 
a mental shock at least temporarily, and for 
some years past had impaired her mental 
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processes so·that in his judgment this· mental 
condition would not allo·w her to comprehend 
and appreciate the nature of legal papers that 
might be served upon her." 
An opposing affidavit was filed to the effect that 
she had been notified by letter two years earlier that 
plaintiff had bid on the property and that something 
must be done. 
The court concluded from this evidence, which 
is much stronger than that in the instant case, that 
there was an insufficient sl1ovving to open the default. 
In Cooper v. D~on; 58 Col. App. 2d 789, 131 P. 
2d 733, it was held t~at the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to vacate a_ default judg-
ment where the defendarit's-aff:idavit was to the effect 
that she was ill and at times had to stay in bed~ For 
other cases t<? likeeffect~ee: Romev. Warskafsy, 299 
Ill. App. 609, 19 N.E. 2d 759;Thomas y. Arnold, 192 
Ark. 1127, 96 S.Vv. 2d 1108; Ewes v. Davison-Paxon 
; Co., 4~ Ga.- App.- ?22, ~-61 S.E. 275_~. ~ 
As positive evidence in the record that Mr. Arn-
old Dixon was in full possession of his mental facul-
ties and>\vas able to conta-Ct an attorney and conduct 
business affairs just shortly before he vvas served with 
process in the pre~i~nt action is ·the fact that he exe-
cuted a deed to Valley Invest:qtent Company, which 
contained a. comprehensive _recital of factual matters 
with relation ' to ·the -Dixon Rahch -Company and 
• . .:·· ::-•. . ... ·~ .. - ..-~4i. 
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which was executed apparently in Provo, Utah, and 
acknowledged before Maurice Harding, Notary Pub-
lic, residing at Provo, Utnh. (See file on Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion to Set Aside Default.) 
Further evidence of his capacity and ability both 
physically and mentally is to be found in the cornpre-
hensive affidavit which he filed in support of the 
Motion to Vacate and Motion to Re(:onside:r CR. 59). 
Surely, if his affidavit \Vas entitled to be filed as rep-
resenting a basis for vacating the judgment, it also 
stands as an admission of the existence of mental 
facility and physical ability to contact counsel had 
he been so inclined. The plain fact is that he did 
nothing, but quite obviously could have done some-
thing had he thought either he or the Dixon Ranch 
Company had any interest in the property. 
Certainly no excusable neglect can be made out 
from the bare statement that Mr. Arnold Dixon is 
and has been for a long time seriously ill, in view 
of the fact that he was able to appear a few months 
previously for the purpose of executing a deed, and 
a few months afterward to make a comprehensive 
affidavit. As a matter of fact, the affidavit of Paul 
Dixon which recites the facts of the long illness does 
not purport to say that because of the long illness 
Arnold Dixon could not or did not notify interested 
parties, but only that Arnold Dixon "is and for a 
long time has been seriously ill and he did not notify 
interested parties." 
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The more logically inferable reason why he 
did not notify interested parties is that he considered 
that neither he nor the Ranch Company had any in-
terest in the property. 
The only other basis shown by the affidavits to 
even remotely hint at excusable neglect is the affi-
davit of Phil Hansen, one-time attorney for Dixon 
Ranch Company. It should be noted initially, that 
the Dixon Ranch Company had been in default for 
87 days .before the September 9, 1951 date which 
affiant sets as the time when counsel agreed to allow 
hirn time in which to plead. 
The court carefully considered and weighed this 
affidavit as he, of course, was entitled to do in de-
terming whether excusable neglect had been made 
out, and concluded that it was not pursuasive to hi~ 
that excusable neglect had been made out. In this 
he vvas fully justified. Excusable neglect to justify 
voiding a default cannot be predicated upon some-
thing which is alleged to have occurred 86 days after 
the default has occurred and 60 days after that default 
has been entered. It can have no force or effect in 
establishing excusable neglect. Nor has appellant 
claimed more for it than evide:r1ce to sustain its theory 
that it had been guilty only ~f excusable neglect from 
which it should be relieved: 
In Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Neilson :Land & 
.Water Company, 43 Utah 406, 134 P. 911, and again 
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in McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 104 P. 731, 
it has been held such a promise as alleged in the affi. 
davit of Phil I-Iansen, even if accepted as true, would 
not be sufficient to justify a claim of excusable 
neglect. 
In Elms v. Elms, 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 164 P. 2d 
936, the principles governing cases such as this are 
fully expounded. In that case it is said: 
"It is the duty of every party desiring to 
resist an action or to participate in a judicial 
pn>ceeding to take timely and adequate steps 
to retain counsel or to act in his own person 
to avoid an undesirable judgn1ent. Unless in 
arranging for his defense he shows that he 
has exercised such reasonable diligence as a 
man of ordinary prudence usually bestows 
upon important business his motion for relief 
. . . will be denied. Courts neither act as guar-
dians for incompetent parties nor for those 
who are grossly careless of their own affairs. 
All must be governed by the rules in force uni-
versally applied according to the shovving 
made ... The la"v frowns upon setting aside 
default judgments resulting from inexcusable 
neglect of the co:r11plainant. The only occasion 
for the application ... is where a party is un-
expectedly placed in a situation to his injury 
without fault or negligence of his o"vn and 
against which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded. Neither inadvertence nor neg-
lect "vill warrant judicial relief unless it may 
reasonably be classified as of the excusable 
variety upon a sufficient shovv-ing." 
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In Peterson v. Crosier 29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860, 
it was held that the fact the defendant would have 
lost his job had he attended the trial was not a suf-
ficient showing of excusable neglect to constitute a 
ground for vacating judgment. 
B. The defendants failed to establish a meritorious 
defense which would requ!re the court to vacate the 
default. 
The case of Queagly v. Willardson, 35 Utah 414, 
100 P. 930, cited by the appellant, holds that the 
court in passing upon whether a meritorious defense 
is asserted, may not determine the truth or falsity 
of the averments but only the question of whether 
the defense asserted is meritorious. As the court so 
aptly points out in the present case in his Memoran-
dum Decision, the defendant admits by the answer 
which was stricken, that the taxes had been paid, 
since it offers to pay or settle them. This leaves only 
a bare assertion by the affiant Paul Dixon, that the 
plaintiff and his predecessors have not been in pos-
session openly, notoriously and adversely for the 
requisite period of time. The record reveals that the 
appellant corporation passed whatever title it had to 
the Valley Investment Company in 1950 .. Thus, it 
appears that no;ne of the parties asserting rights as 
appellants would be in a position to claim that theirs 
was a meritorious defense to the existing action. 
Where the defense is as tenuous as that upon which 
the appellant has to rely, surely the court could justi-
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fiably conclude that the defense which had to be 
based on so many contingencies was not sufficiently 
meritorious as to warrant setting aside the default. 
The court was thus not determining the truth 
or falsity of any of the evidence, but only consider-
ing the assertions in the answer and the affidavits 
in relation to the uncontradicted facts, to determine 
whether a meritorious defense was asserted. 
* * * 
Thus, it appears conclusively, that appellant is 
unable to sustain either of the two requirements it 
must sustain in order to secure a reversal. First, no 
showing of excusable neglect has been made out. To 
the contrary, the neglect appears completely inex-
cusable as a legal proposition. Second, appellant 
failed to assert a meritorious defense which would 
justify the court in reversing the trial court. 
The trial court in the exercise of its sound dis-
cretion and with a clear understanding of the prin-
ciples upon which that discretion must be based, and 
after carefully studying and weighing the evidence 
of excusable neglect, and after careful study of the 
claimed meritorious defense, upon correct principles 
concluded that no showing of excusable neglect had 
been made out and no meritorious defense shown. 
Appellant to prevail must make out a case that 
the trial judge, who clearly had the appropriate prin-
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ciples in mind to guide him, acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and a bused his discretion-not on one, 
but on both of these propositions. This it has failed 
to do. The court, to the contrary has done exactly 
what the case of Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 254, 90 
P. 897, has indicated that he might do, that is, to 
apply his discretion to the facts as they appear in 
each individual case. It is respectfully submitted, that 
this court on appeal should affirm the ruling of the 
trial court, there being no manifest abuse· of discre-
tion shown. 
* * * 
An examination of the cases relied upon by the 
appellant's brief reveals at once the clear distinction 
between those cases and the instant case. An analysis 
of the Cutler v. Haycock case reveals ample cause for 
setting aside the default where the defendant's ·at-
torney had actually filed a demurrer which was en 
route, and where transportation difficulties beset the 
parties and vvhere the demurrer was filed within a 
matter of one or two days, and the entire condition 
was attributable to the lack of facilities for commu-
nication between the defendant and his counsel. 
Again, in-Burd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908, 
cited by appellant, the court had actually opened the 
default within his discretion, but thenimposed a con-
dition ¥/hich ;Was. not. met,· and. whereupon the court 
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enforced the default. The court held that imposition 
of such a condition was beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court. Thus, factually, the case bears no relation-
ship to the instant case. In that case the defendant 
had filed a motion to make more definite and to 
furnish a bill of particulars and thus was actively 
engaged in the progress of the case when the default 
was entered for failure to file an answer. This case 
clearly is no panillel to the instant case. 
POINT fl 
The Court correctly ruled that if would not be 
proper to grant the motion to vacate merely for the pur-
pose of permitting a cross action between certain of the 
defendants. 
The only information we have in the record 
with regard to the filing of a cross action by the ap-
pellant is that the Memorandum Decision recites that 
in oral argument counsel for defendant stated that 
he proposed to attack the deed from Arnold Dixon 
to Valley Investment Company. Accordingly, with 
nothing more than this to sustain the burden of ap-
pellant's argument on the second point in his brief, 
it is extremely doubtful that any point is raised by 
the brief for review. 
However, the court did not base his denial of 
the motion .to vacate upon the proposition that the 
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re-opening of the case \Yould be only for the purpose 
of a cross-action between the appellants and the Val-
ley Investment Company (Appellant's Brief p. 12). 
To the contrary, the court very clearly stated 
in his Memorandum Decision, that he concluded that 
it would be improper to grant the motion merely for 
the purpose of permitting a collateral cross action 
between defendants CR. 68). In other words, the fact 
that one defendant desired to file a cross action 
against another defendant w.~s not alone a sufficient 
ground for setting aside the default. 
vVhether the rules of Civil Procedure would or 
would not allovv such an action within the frame-
work of this suit is not material. The plain fact is 
that no such ground, as here considered, exists under 
Rule 60 (b) which would justify setting aside the 
default for such a purpose. Therefore, the court was 
entirely correct in his observation that such:a ground 
is not a proper ground upon which to grant a motion 
to set aside the default. 
* * * 
It is respectfully submitted tha,t this is a judg-
ment which should be accor,ded the finality cyvhich it 
deserves and freedom from upset by a belated at-
tempt to oust the plaintiff from property upon which 
·he and his predecessors havepaid taxes for 15 years; 
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that the trial court was well within his discretionary 
authority in ruling as he did, and that the judgment 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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